, Volume 162, Issue 2, pp 265–273 | Cite as

Single-case probabilities and the case of Monty Hall: Levy’s view

  • Peter Baumann


In Baumann (American Philosophical Quarterly 42: 71–79, 2005) I argued that reflections on a variation of the Monty Hall problem throws a very general skeptical light on the idea of single-case probabilities. Levy (Synthese, forthcoming, 2007) puts forward some interesting objections which I answer here.


Monty Hall Single-case probabilities Ken Levy Peter Baumann 


Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.


  1. Baumann P. (2005) Three doors, two players, and single-case probabilities. American Philosophical Quarterly 42: 71–79Google Scholar
  2. Freund J.E. (1965) Puzzle or paradox. The American Statistician 19(4): 29–44CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  3. Gillies D. (2000) Philosophical theories of probability. Routledge, LondonGoogle Scholar
  4. Horgan T. (1995) Let’s make a deal. Philosophical Papers 24: 209–222Google Scholar
  5. Levy, K. (2007). Baumann on the Monty Hall problem and single-case probabilities. Synthese, forthcoming. doi: 10.1007/s11229-006-9065-5
  6. Moser P.K., Mulder D.H. (1994) Probability in rational decision-making. Philosophical Papers 23: 109–128Google Scholar
  7. Shafer G. (1985) Conditional probability. International Statistical Review 53: 261–277CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  8. vos Savant M. (1992) Ask Marylin. St. Martin’s, New YorkGoogle Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2007

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of AberdeenAberdeenUK

Personalised recommendations