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Synthese

, Volume 162, Issue 2, pp 265–273 | Cite as

Single-case probabilities and the case of Monty Hall: Levy’s view

  • Peter Baumann
Article

Abstract

In Baumann (American Philosophical Quarterly 42: 71–79, 2005) I argued that reflections on a variation of the Monty Hall problem throws a very general skeptical light on the idea of single-case probabilities. Levy (Synthese, forthcoming, 2007) puts forward some interesting objections which I answer here.

Keywords

Monty Hall Single-case probabilities Ken Levy Peter Baumann 

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References

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2007

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of AberdeenAberdeenUK

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