Synthese

, Volume 162, Issue 1, pp 31–35 | Cite as

Could there be exactly two things?

Article

Abstract

Many philosophers think that, necessarily, any material objects have a fusion (let’s call that doctrine “Universalism”). In this paper I point out a couple of strange consequences of Universalism and related doctrines, and suggest that they are strange enough to constitute a powerful argument against those views.

Keywords

Ontology Universalism Mereology 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2007

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of Wisconsin – MadisonMadisonUSA

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