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Horgan on Sleeping Beauty

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Abstract

With the notable exception of David Lewis, most of those writing on the Sleeping Beauty problem have argued that 1/3 is the correct answer. Terence Horgan has provided the clearest account of why, contrary to Lewis, Beauty has evidence against the proposition that the coin comes up heads when she awakens on Monday. In this paper, I argue that Horgan’s proposal fails because it neglects important facts about epistemic probability.

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References

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Author information

Correspondence to Joel Pust.

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Pust, J. Horgan on Sleeping Beauty. Synthese 160, 97–101 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-006-9102-4

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Keywords

  • Sleeping Beauty problem
  • Epistemic probability
  • Terence Horgan