, Volume 153, Issue 3, pp 417–450

How to, and how not to, bridge computational cognitive neuroscience and Husserlian phenomenology of time consciousness

Original Paper

DOI: 10.1007/s11229-006-9100-6

Cite this article as:
Grush, R. Synthese (2006) 153: 417. doi:10.1007/s11229-006-9100-6


A number of recent attempts to bridge Husserlian phenomenology of time consciousness and contemporary tools and results from cognitive science or computational neuroscience are described and critiqued. An alternate proposal is outlined that lacks the weaknesses of existing accounts.


Time consciousness Husserl Trajectory estimation Representational momentum Temporal illusions Specious present 

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of CaliforniaSan DiegoUSA

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