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Synthese

, Volume 161, Issue 3, pp 375–392 | Cite as

Doxastic freedom

  • Matthias Steup
Original Paper

Keywords

Voluntary Control Reactive Attitude Epistemic Reason Doxastic Attitude Classic Compatibilism 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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References

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2007

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophySt. Cloud State UniversitySt. CloudUSA

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