Synthese

, Volume 158, Issue 1, pp 109–125 | Cite as

Embedded Cognition and Mental Causation: Setting Empirical Bounds on Metaphysics

Open Access
Original Paper

Abstract

In this paper, we challenge Jaegwon Kim’s version of neural reductionism according to which the causal powers of mental properties are pre-empted by those of neural properties. Using empirical and theoretical developments from the field of embedded cognition, we articulate and defend a notion of process externalism that extends Clark and Chalmers’ notion of an extended mind. We argue that process externalism undermines one of Kim’s key premises leading to the alternative conclusion that mental causation cannot be reduced to neural causation. Instead, mental properties have their own new causal powers just like other scientifically established macroproperties.

Keywords

Kim Mental causation Embedded cognition Externalism 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Faculty of PhilosophyUniversity of GroningenGroningenThe Netherlands
  2. 2.Faculty of PhilosophyTilburg UniversityTilburgThe Netherlands

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