, Volume 157, Issue 1, pp 129–139

Superassertibility and the Equivalence Schema: A Dilemma for Wright’s Antirealist


DOI: 10.1007/s11229-006-9037-9

Cite this article as:
Smith, D.C. Synthese (2007) 157: 129. doi:10.1007/s11229-006-9037-9


Crispin Wright champions the notion of superassertibility as providing a truth predicate that is congenial to antirealists in many debates in that it satisfies relevant platitudes concerning truth and does so in a very minimal way. He motivates such a claim by arguing that superassertibility can satisfy the equivalence schema: it is superassertible that P if and only if P. I argue that Wright’s attempted proof that superassertibility can satisfy this schema is unsuccessful, because it requires a premise that has not been properly motivated and is prima facie implausible. I further argue that, even if the dubious premise is accepted, the resulting proof is intuitionistically invalid. This is problematic, because a proponent of superassertibility as a truth predicate has independent reasons to affect a logical revision in the direction of intuitionism. The resulting dilemma suggests that superassertibility may not be an adequate truth candidate for any significant ranges of discourse.


Antirealism Crispin Wright Equivalence Schema Intuitionistic logic Minimal truth Realism Superassertibility 

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of philosophyKent State UniversityKentUS

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