, Volume 151, Issue 3, pp 335–346 | Cite as

Functional reduction and emergence in the physical sciences

  • Alexander Rueger
Original Paper


Kim’s model of ‘functional reduction’ of properties is shown to fail in a class of cases from physics involving properties at different spatial levels. The diagnosis of this failure leads to a non-reductive account of the relation of micro and macro properties.


Emergence Functional properties Kim’s view of reduction Micro/macro levels Reduction Singular Perturbations 


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of AlbertaEdmontonCanada

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