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Synthese

, Volume 157, Issue 1, pp 25–45 | Cite as

Entitlement and rationality

  • C. S. Jenkins
Research Article

Abstract

This paper takes the form of a critical discussion of Crispin Wright’s notion of entitlement of cognitive project. I examine various strategies for defending the claim that entitlement can make acceptance of a proposition epistemically rational, including one which appeals to epistemic consequentialism. Ultimately, I argue, none of these strategies is successful, but the attempt to isolate points of disagreement with Wright issues in some positive proposals as to how an epistemic consequentialist should characterize epistemic rationality.

Keywords

Entitlement Epistemology Epistemic Rationality 

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Copyright information

© Springer 2007

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Arche AHRC Research Centre, Philosophical and Anthropological StudiesUniversity of St. AndrewsSt. AndrewsUK

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