Synthese

, Volume 145, Issue 1, pp 29–43

Alethic Functionalism and Our Folk Theory of Truth

Article

Abstract

According to alethic functionalism, truth is a higher-order multiply realizable property of propositions. After briefly presenting the view’s main principles and motivations, I defend alethic functionalism from recent criticisms raised against it by Cory Wright. Wright argues that alethic functionalism will collapse either into deflationism or into a view that takes “true” as simply ambiguous. I reject both claims.

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Copyright information

© Springer 2005

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of ConnecticutStorrsU.S.A

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