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Studia Logica

, Volume 107, Issue 2, pp 445–450 | Cite as

Jody Azzouni, The Rule-Following Paradox and Its Implications for Metaphysics, Springer (Synthese Library Series No. 382), 2017, pp. \(\hbox {viii} + 124\), ISBN: 978-3-319-49060-1 (Hardcover) $99.99; (Softcover) $89.99; (eBook) $69.99

  • Juan J. ColominaEmail author
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References

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.The University of Texas at AustinAustinUSA

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