Studia Logica

, Volume 103, Issue 5, pp 955–984 | Cite as

Towards a Grammar of Bayesian Coherentism

  • Michael Schippers


One of the integral parts of Bayesian coherentism is the view that the relation of ‘being no less coherent than’ is fully determined by the probabilistic features of the sets of propositions to be ordered. In the last one and a half decades, a variety of probabilistic measures of coherence have been put forward. However, there is large disagreement as to which of these measures best captures the pre-theoretic notion of coherence. This paper contributes to the debate on coherence measures by considering three classes of adequacy constraints. Various independence and dependence relations between the members of each class will be taken into account in order to reveal the ‘grammar’ of probabilistic coherence measures. Afterwards, existing proposals are examined with respect to this list of desiderata. Given that for purely mathematical reasons there can be no measure that satisfies all constraints, the grammar allows the coherentist to articulate an informed pluralist stance as regards probabilistic measures of coherence.


Probabilistic measures of coherence Adequacy constraints Formal epistemology 


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of OldenburgOldenburgGermany

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