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Studia Logica

, Volume 101, Issue 6, pp 1185–1214 | Cite as

Revocable Belief Revision

  • Hans van DitmarschEmail author
Article
  • 129 Downloads

Abstract

Krister Segerberg proposed irrevocable belief revision, to be contrasted with standard belief revision, in a setting wherein belief of propositional formulas is modelled explicitly. This suggests that in standard belief revision is revocable: one should be able to unmake (‘revoke’) the fresh belief in the revision formula, given yet further information that contradicts it. In a dynamic epistemic logical setting for belief revision, for multiple agents, we investigate what the requirements are for revocable belief revision. By this we not merely mean recovering belief in non-modal propositions, as in the recovery principle for belief contraction, but recovering belief in modal propositions: beliefs about beliefs. These requirements are almost never met, a surprising result.

Keywords

Belief revision Dynamic epistemic logic Multi-agent systems 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.LORIA, CNRS – Université de LorraineVanduvre-lès-NancyFrance

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