Carnap’s Theory of Descriptions and its Problems
Carnap’s theory of descriptions was restricted in two ways. First, the descriptive conditions had to be non-modal. Second, only primitive predicates or the identity predicate could be used to predicate something of the descriptum. The motivating reasons for these two restrictions that can be found in the literature will be critically discussed. Both restrictions can be relaxed, but Carnap’s theory can still be blamed for not dealing adequately with improper descriptions.
KeywordsCarnap Føllesdal Quine Martí Kremer Modal Logic Individual concept Identity Descriptions Uniqueness Collapse Slingshot Self-predication
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