In Meyer’s promising account  deontic logic is reduced to a dynamic logic. Meyer claims that with his account “we get rid of most (if not all) of the nasty paradoxes that have plagued traditional deontic logic.” But as was shown by van der Meyden in , Meyer’s logic also contains a paradoxical formula. In this paper we will show that another paradox can be proven, one which also effects Meyer’s “solution” to contrary to duty obligations and his logic in general.
Keywordsdynamic deontic logic PDeL Chisholm’s paradox contrary to duty obligations
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