Studia Logica

, Volume 89, Issue 3, pp 333–341 | Cite as

Probabilistic Justification and the Regress Problem

  • Jeanne PeijnenburgEmail author
  • David Atkinson


We discuss two objections that foundationalists have raised against infinite chains of probabilistic justification. We demonstrate that neither of the objections can be maintained.


Probabilistic justification regress problem foundationalism infinitism 


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2008

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Faculty of PhilosophyUniversity of GroningenGroningenThe Netherlands

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