Towards a “Sophisticated” Model of Belief Dynamics. Part I: The General Framework
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It is well-known that classical models of belief are not realistic representations of human doxastic capacity; equally, models of actions involving beliefs, such as decisions based on beliefs, or changes of beliefs, suffer from a similar inaccuracies. In this paper, a general framework is presented which permits a more realistic modelling both of instantaneous states of belief, and of the operations involving them. This framework is motivated by some of the inadequacies of existing models, which it overcomes, whilst retaining technical rigour in so far as it relies on known, natural logical and mathematical notions. The companion paper (Towards a “sophisticated” model of belief dynamics. Part II) contains an application of this framework to the particular case of belief revision.
KeywordsRepresentations of belief bounded rationality logical omniscience awareness logical locality belief dynamics iterated revision Gärdenfors postulates rational choice theory framing effect
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