Studia Logica

, Volume 88, Issue 2, pp 263–294

What is the Logic of Inference?

Article

DOI: 10.1007/s11225-008-9105-x

Cite this article as:
Peregrin, J. Stud Logica (2008) 88: 263. doi:10.1007/s11225-008-9105-x

Abstract

The topic of this paper is the question whether there is a logic which could be justly called the logic of inference. It may seem that at least since Prawitz, Dummett and others demonstrated the proof-theoretical prominency of intuitionistic logic, the forthcoming answer is that it is this logic that is the obvious choice for the accolade. Though there is little doubt that this choice is correct (provided that inference is construed as inherently single-conclusion and complying with the Gentzenian structural rules), I do not think that the usual justification of it is satisfactory. Therefore, I will first try to clarify what exactly is meant by the question, and then sketch a conceptual framework in which it can be reasonably handled. I will introduce the concept of ‘inferentially native’ logical operators (those which explicate inferential properties) and I will show that the axiomatization of these operators leads to the axiomatic system of intuitionistic logic. Finally, I will discuss what modifications of this answer enter the picture when more general notions of inference are considered.

Keywords

inference intuitionistic logic proof theory nature of logic logical operators 

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2008

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Logic, Institute of PhilosophyAcademy of Sciences of the Czech RepublicPraha 1Czech Republic
  2. 2.Department of Logic, Faculty of PhilosophyCharles UniversityPraha 1Czech Republic

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