Studia Logica

, Volume 88, Issue 1, pp 113–136

A New Psychologism in Logic? Reflections from the Point of View of Belief Revision


DOI: 10.1007/s11225-008-9099-4

Cite this article as:
Rott, H. Stud Logica (2008) 88: 113. doi:10.1007/s11225-008-9099-4


This paper addresses the question whether the past couple of decades of formal research in belief revision offers evidence of a new psychologism in logic. In the first part I examine five potential arguments in favour of this thesis and find them all wanting. In the second part of the paper I argue that belief revision research has climbed up a hierarchy of models for the change of doxastic states that appear to be clearly normative at the bottom, but are more amenable to an empirical-descriptive interpretation on higher levels. I conclude that this observation might offer a foothold for the thesis that there is a new psychologism in logic.


Psychologism logic belief change belief revision normativity doxastic states 

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2008

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of RegensburgRegensburgGermany

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