Studia Logica

, Volume 86, Issue 3, pp 435–454 | Cite as

Understanding the Brandenburger-Keisler Paradox

Open Access
Article

Abstract

Adam Brandenburger and H. Jerome Keisler have recently discovered a two person Russell-style paradox. They show that the following configurations of beliefs is impossible: Ann believes that Bob assumes that Ann believes that Bob’s assumption is wrong. In [7] a modal logic interpretation of this paradox is proposed. The idea is to introduce two modal operators intended to represent the agents’ beliefs and assumptions. The goal of this paper is to take this analysis further and study this paradox from the point of view of a modal logician. In particular, we show that the paradox can be seen as a theorem of an appropriate hybrid logic.

Keywords

Epistemic Foundations of Game Theory Epistemic Logic Belief Paradox 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2007

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Institute for Logic, Language and ComputationsUniversity of AmsterdamAmsterdamThe Netherlands

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