Studia Logica

, Volume 86, Issue 2, pp 343–350 | Cite as

The Smith-Walley Interpretation of Subjective Probability: An Appreciation

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Abstract

The right interpretation of subjective probability is implicit in the theories of upper and lower odds, and upper and lower previsions, developed, respectively, by Cedric Smith (1961) and Peter Walley (1991). On this interpretation you are free to assign contingent events the probability 1 (and thus to employ conditionalization as a method of probability revision) without becoming vulnerable to a weak Dutch book.

Keywords

Dutch book coherence strict coherence subjective probability probability kinematics 
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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2007

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of MathematicsThe University of TennesseeKnoxvilleU.S.A

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