Studia Logica

, Volume 79, Issue 3, pp 373–407 | Cite as

The Undecidability of Iterated Modal Relativization

Article

Abstract

In dynamic epistemic logic and other fields, it is natural to consider relativization as an operator taking sentences to sentences. When using the ideas and methods of dynamic logic, one would like to iterate operators. This leads to iterated relativization. We are also concerned with the transitive closure operation, due to its connection to common knowledge. We show that for three fragments of the logic of iterated relativization and transitive closure, the satisfiability problems are fi1 Σ11–complete. Two of these fragments do not include transitive closure. We also show that the question of whether a sentence in these fragments has a finite (tree) model is fi0 Σ01–complete. These results go via reduction to problems concerning domino systems.

Keywords

Dynamic epistemic logic iterated relativization modal logic undecidability 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science + Business Media, Inc. 2005

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of MathematicsIndiana UniversityBloomingtonUSA

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