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Review of G. Felicitas Munzel’s Kant’s Conception of Pedagogy: Toward Education for Freedom

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Gregory Bynum, “Kant’s Conception of Duty: An Expanded View,” in C.W. Ruitenberg, Ed., Philosophy of Education 2012 (Urbana, IL: Philosophy of Education Society, 2012), 147–149.

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    Or, in other words, my response to the question of whether there can be education for moral character was, “No, because virtue cannot be taught.” In contrast Munzel, while agreeing that virtue cannot be taught, takes a broader view of education for moral character than the one I took, and defines it differently from the way I did. I appreciate Munzel’s different view and definition, and will appreciatively engage with it in this review.

  3. 3.

    Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. P. Guyer & A.W. Wood (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 432–433.

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Correspondence to Gregory L. Bynum.

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Bynum, G.L. Review of G. Felicitas Munzel’s Kant’s Conception of Pedagogy: Toward Education for Freedom. Stud Philos Educ 38, 331–333 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11217-018-9637-0

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