Skip to main content

Advertisement

SpringerLink
Log in

Changing the Definition of Education. On Kant’s Educational Paradox Between Freedom and Restraint

  • Published:
Studies in Philosophy and Education Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

Ever since Kant asked: “How am I to develop the sense of freedom in spite of the restraint?” in his lecture on education, the tension between necessary educational influence and unacceptable restriction of the child’s individual development and freedom has been considered an educational paradox. Many have suggested solutions to the paradox; however, this article endorses recent discussions in educational philosophy that pursue the need to fundamentally rethink our understanding of education and upbringing. In this article it is argued that it is incomprehensible to describe an intervention of an educator as a constraint on a child’s actions and that such an intervention would be in need of justification; as Kant and many others after him have done. Educational intervention should not be understood as a restriction of a child’s endeavour to learn, because any educational intervention is educational. Furthermore, it is argued that the notion of restraint is based on the concept of human beings as radically separated which lead to the assumption that education is restrictive per se. In contrast, this article argues that indoctrination, manipulation, and coercion are rather phenomena within our educational forms of life. Recognizing the interrelations between human beings should play a constitutive part in the conceptualisation of individual freedom. A bond with others is the foundation upon which a child develops its own identity and an understanding of itself as an agent who can express its own will and takes responsibility for its words and actions.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. For a further discussion on this subject see, for example, Winch (2002).

  2. For a further discussion on this subject see, for example, Cuypers (2010).

  3. For a further discussion on this subject see, for example, Masschelein (1998).

  4. Ruhloff (1975, p. 10) and Kauder and Fischer (1999, p. 125) observe, moreover, that Kant already from a purely philological perspective clarifies the possibility of overcoming the dilemma. Kant does not write “Wie kultiviere ich Freiheit durch Zwang?”, but writes instead “bei dem Zwange?”.

  5. Vogel (1990), for example, discusses the question in relation to Kant's antinomy of freedom, Cavaller (1996) in relation to Kant’s theory of ethics, and numerous others have discussed the question in relation to Kant's critique of pure reasoning.

  6. Many philosophers during the nineteenth and twentieth Century, (for example the German idealism, existentialism, German and French critical theory) criticised Kant for his chosen starting point in relation to the question of free will and education. The critique often concentrated on Kant’s initial principal being the notion of an autonomous subject. Several Kantian schools in philosophy discussed his thoughts in another light. Recent contributions as, for example, Herman (1997), Wood (1999), Gates (2002), Gonzalez (2009) or Roth (2011) discuss whether or not Kant is rather misunderstood as a defender of individualism and show how Kant emphasises the social dimension and the value and importance of interrelatedness in his philosophy.

  7. In order to make sense of the claim that you know what something is, you do not have to be able to practically use the object yourself.

  8. Compare even one of Kant’s further examples, in which he argues that the educator should constrain the child’s freedom: “as soon as he screams or is too boisterously happy, he annoys others” and “interfere[s] with the liberty of others” (Kant 1900, p. 28).

  9. Many contemporary discussions regarding this passage from Kant’s works give rise to questions concerning the author’s own awareness of these different phenomena. To discuss different questions under a singular concept, as Kant does in this excerpt, increases the risk of misunderstanding the point so that the actual problem remains unclear. For some suggestions in this question, see Schaffar (2009).

  10. Christine M. Korsgaard’s discussion with two of her critics at the Central Division Meeting of the American Philosophy Association in May 1998 is an illuminative illustration of the kind of exegetical approach I wish to avoid. The problem facing Korsgard and her critics is that a rational self needs to exist before it is able to accept and subject itself under the moral law, while it is the moral law that constitutes the existence of the kind of rationality which is needed to accept the moral law. “How can I give a law to a self that does not yet exist? How can making a law for someone bring that something into existence?” (Korsgaard 1998, p. 5, quoting Rachel Cohon). Without being able to address this discussion in any detail, I want to express a lingering concern that accounts like this base their starting point on the idea that we in any way could be able to dissociate something “own” or “original” in one person from something or someone external that exists in radical separation from the person. Otherwise the questions what should be considered as existing first, what is the cause and what is the effect in a person’s (moral) development are not understandable. In this way I see many Kantian scholars operating with the notion of radical separateness, independently whether they argue for or against there being an agent or having rationality or an identity in the newborn before he/she meets the social world.

  11. Cf. Kant's division of the positive and negative submissiveness of a child (Kant 1900, p. 27).

  12. For a closer examination of what I take this difference in perspective to mean, see Hertzberg (1997).

  13. To avoid further misunderstandings: Of course you might misuse your power and physically and mentally abuse your child as a parent or a teacher, just as communities and ideological systems might exploit people for their own purposes. Even the fact that this is often the case is no real objection to the conceptual connection that I am trying to draw attention to, because my argument is not an empirical one. Cf. the discussion about ignorance and abuse of someone between P. Winch and Phillips in Hertzberg (2001).

References

  • Ballauff, Th., Schaller, K. (1970). Kants pädagogische Grundlegung. In Th. Ballauff, K. Schaller (Eds.), Pädagogik. Eine Geschichte der Erziehung und Bildung (pp. 428–445). Vol. I/12. Freiburg, München: Alber.

  • Bauman, Z. (1992). Thinking sociologically. Oxford, Cambridge: Blackwell.

    Google Scholar 

  • Benner, D. (2001). Allgemeine Pädagogik. Eine systematisch-problemgeschichtliche Einführung in die Grundstruktur pädagogischen Denkens und Handelns. Weinheim, München: Juventa.

    Google Scholar 

  • Biesta, G. J. J. (2006). Beyond learning. Democratic education for a human future. Boulder, Co: Paradigm Publishers.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bollnow, O. F. (1960). Begegnung und Bildung. In R. Guardini & O. F. Bollnow (Eds.), Begegnung und Bildung. Würzburg: Werkbund-Verlag.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bonnett, M., & Cuypers, S. (2003). Autonomy and authenticity in education. In N. Blake, P. Smeyers, R. Smith, & P. Standish (Eds.), The Blackwell guide to the philosophy of education (pp. 326–340). Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing.

    Google Scholar 

  • Buber, M. (2002). Ich und Du. Ditzingen: Reklam.

    Google Scholar 

  • Cavaller, G. (1996). Die Kultivierung von Freiheit trotz Zwang (Kant). Vierteljahresschrift für wissenschaftliche Pädagogik, 72, 87–95.

    Google Scholar 

  • Cuypers, S. (2010). Autonomy in R.S. Peters’ educational theory. Journal of Philosophy of Education, 43(S1), 189–207.

    Google Scholar 

  • Frankfurt, H. G. (1998). Necessity, volition, and love. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Fuhr, T. (1999). Sind Educanden Subjekte ihrer Erziehung? Fremd- und Selbstbestimmung im Prozess der Erziehung. Ein Beitrag zur pädagogischen Formenlehre. Vierteljahresschrift für wissenschaftliche Pädagogik, 75, 44–62.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gadamer, H.-G. (1990). Wahrheit und Methode. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gaita, R. (1991). Good and evil: an absolute conception. London, Macmillan, New York: St. Martins Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gardner, P. (1985). The paradox of moral education: a reassessment. Journal of Philosophy of Education, 19(1), 39–48.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Gates, D. C. (2002). The fact of reason and the face of the other: autonomy, constraint, and rational agency in Kant and Levinas. The southern Journal of Philosophy, XL, 493–522.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Gonzalez, A. M. (2009). Kant’s contribution to social theory. Kant-Studien, 100(1), 77–105.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Heidegger, M. (1996). Being and time. Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York.

    Google Scholar 

  • Herbart, J. F. (1903). Allgemeine Pädagogik. Aus dem Zwecke der Erziehung abgeleitet (1806). In Fr. Bartholomäi (Ed.), J. F. Herbarts Pädagogische Schriften. Mit Herbarts Biographie herausgegeben. Langensalza: Hermann Beyer & Söhne.

    Google Scholar 

  • Herman, B. (1997). A cosmopolitan kingdom of ends. In A. Reath, B. Herman, & C. Korsgaard (Eds.), Reclaiming the history of ethics. Essays for John Rawls. Cambridge: University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hertzberg, L. (1997). Voices of the will. In L. Alanen, S. Heinämaa, & T. Wallgren (Eds.), Commonality and particularity in ethics (pp. 75–94). Houndmills, Basingstoke: Macmillan Press Ltd.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hertzberg, L. (2001). Om att vara en nästa. In J. Backström & G. Torrkulla (Eds.), Moralfilosofiska essäer (pp. 137–154). Stockholm: Thales.

    Google Scholar 

  • Illich, I. (1971). Deschooling society. New York: Harper & Row.

  • Kant, I. (1900). On Education. Translation Annette Churton. Boston: D.C. Heath and Co. http://oll.libertyfund.org/index.php?option=com_staticxt&staticfile=show.php%3Ftitle=356&Itemid=27. Accessed 16 Apr 2012.

  • Kauder, P., & Fischer, W. (1999). Immanuel Kant über Pädagogik: 7 Studien. Baltmannsweiler: Schneider-Verl. Hohengehren.

    Google Scholar 

  • Korsgaard, C. (1998). A reply to Carol Voeller and Rachel Cohon: ‘The Moral Law as the Source of Normativity’ by Carol Voeller, ‘The Roots of Reason’ by Rachel Cohon’. http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~korsgaar/APA.SN.Reply.Voeller&Cohen.pdf. Accessed 14 Dec 2012.

  • Kronqvist, C. (2008). What we talk about when we talk about love. Painosalama, OY: Åbo Akademi University.

    Google Scholar 

  • Laverty, M. J. (2010). Learning our concepts. Journal of Philosophy of Education, 43(S1), 27–40.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lévinas, E. (1999). Die Philosophie und die Idee des Unendlichen. In E. Lévinas (Ed.), Die Spur des Anderen. Untersuchungen zur Phänomenologie und Sozialphilosophie (pp. 185–208). Freiburg/München: Verlag Karl Alber.

    Google Scholar 

  • Løvlie, L. (2012). Kant’s invitation to educational thinking. In K. Roth & C. W. Surprenant (Eds.), Kant and education: interpretations and commentary (pp. 107–123). New York: Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Luckner, A. (2003). Erziehung zur Freiheit. Immanuel Kant und die Pädagogik. Pädagogik, 7–8, 72–76.

    Google Scholar 

  • Masschelein, J. (1996). Die Frage nach einem pädagogischen Grundgedankengang. Bemerkungen über Handlen und Pluralität. In J. Masschelein & M. Wimmer (Eds.), Alterität, Pluralität, Gerechtigkeit. Randgäng der Pädagogik (pp. 107–125). St. Augustin: Academia Verlag.

    Google Scholar 

  • Masschelein, J. (1998). How to imagine something exterior to the system: critical education as problematization. Educational Theory, 48(4), 521–530.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Masschelein, J. (2000). Can education still be critical? Journal of Education, 34(4), 603–616.

    Google Scholar 

  • Masschelein, J., & Ricken, N. (2002). Regulierung von Pluralität—Skizzen vom, Außen“. Erziehungsphilosophische Überlegungen zu Funktion und Aufgabe einer Allgemeinen Erziehungswissenschaft. Zeitschrift für Erziehungswissenschaft, Beiheft, 1, 93–108.

    Google Scholar 

  • Mead, G. H. (1934). Mind, self, and society. From the standpoint of a social behaviourist. Chicago: Chicago University Press.

  • Miller-Kipp, G. (1992). ‘Wie kultiviere ich die Freiheit bei dem Zwange?’ Pädagogische Fragen auf eine unsterbliche Frage, historisch durchgesehen. In R. Dietrich/C. Pfeiffer (Ed.), Freiheit und Kontingenz. Zur interdisziplinären Anthropologie menschlicher Freiheiten und Bedingungen. Festschrift für Christian Walther (pp. 267–283). Heidelberg: Asanger.

  • Neill, A. S. (1960). Summerhill. A radical approach to childrearing. New York: Hart Publishing.

  • Noddings, N. (1984). Caring: a feminine approach to ethics and moral education. Berkeley: University of California Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Nykänen, H. (2002). The “I”, the “you” and the soul. An ethics of conscience. Åbo: Åbo Akademi University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Peters, R. S. (1963). Reason and habit: the paradox of moral education. In W. R. Niblett (Ed.), Moral education in a changing society (pp. 46–65). London: Faber.

    Google Scholar 

  • Roth, K. (2011). Understanding agency and educating character. Educational Theory, 61(3), 257–274.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ruberg, C. (2002). Wie ist Erziehung möglich?. Bad Heilbrunn: Klinkhardt.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ruhloff, J. (1975). Wie kultiviere ich die Freiheit bei dem Zwange? Vierteljahresschrift für wissenschaftliche Pädagogik, 51, 2–18.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sacher, W. (1984). Erziehungsbedürftigkeit –,moderner Mythos’ oder,Zentralkategorie der anthropologisch-pädagogischen Forschung’. In: Vierteljahresschrift für wissenschaftliche Pädagogik 60, pp. 281–300.

  • Sartre, J.-P. (2003). Being and nothingness: an essay on phenomenological ontology. London: Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Schäfer, A. (2004). Einführung in die Erziehungsphilosophie. Weinheim: Beltz.

    Google Scholar 

  • Schaffar, B. (2009). Allgemeine Pädagogik im Zwiespalt—Zwischen epistemologischer Neutralität und moralischer Einsicht. Würzburg: Ergon.

    Google Scholar 

  • Shapiro, T. (1999). What is a child? In Ethics, 109(4), 715–737.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Vanderstraeten, R., & Biesta, G. J. J. (2001). How is education possible? Preliminary investigations for a theory of education. Educational Philosophy and Theory, 33(1), 7–21.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Vogel, P. (1990). Kausalität und Freiheit in der Pädagogik. Studien im Anschluss an die Freiheitsantinomie bei Kant. Paideia, Studien zur systematischen Pädagogik, Band 9. Frankfurt/M: Verlag Peter Lang.

  • Weisskopf, T. (1970). Kant und die Pädagogik. Beiträge zu einer Monographie. Zürich: EVZ-Verlag.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wimmer, M. (2006). Pädagogik—eine Wissenschaft des Unmöglichen? Vom Sinn des Scheiterns und ungelöster Probleme. Vierteljahresschrift für wissenschaftliche Pädagogik, 82, 145–167.

    Google Scholar 

  • Winch, P. (1991). The idea of social science and its relation to philosophy. London: Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Winch, Ch. (2002). Strong autonomy and education. Educational Theory, 52(1), 27–41.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Winkler, M. (1991). Immanuel Kant über Pädagogik—eine Verführung. Vierteljahresschrift für wissenschaftliche Pädagogik, 67, 241–261.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wittgenstein, L. (1999). Philosophische Untersuchungen. Werkausgabe 1. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.

  • Wood, A. W. (1999). Kant’s ethical thought. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Åbo Akademi University, Strandgatan 2, 65101, Vasa, Finland

    Birgit Schaffar

Authors
  1. Birgit Schaffar
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Birgit Schaffar.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Schaffar, B. Changing the Definition of Education. On Kant’s Educational Paradox Between Freedom and Restraint. Stud Philos Educ 33, 5–21 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11217-013-9357-4

Download citation

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11217-013-9357-4

Keywords

Search

Navigation