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Social Justice Research

, Volume 27, Issue 2, pp 149–174 | Cite as

Right-Wing Authoritarianism and Social Dominance Orientation Predict Different Moral Signatures

  • Petar MilojevEmail author
  • Danny Osborne
  • Lara M. Greaves
  • Joseph Bulbulia
  • Marc S. Wilson
  • Caitlin L. Davies
  • James H. Liu
  • Chris G. Sibley
Article

Abstract

Moral Foundations Theory posits five distinct foundations of morality: Harm/Care, Fairness/Reciprocity, In-group/Loyalty, Authority/Respect, and Purity/Sanctity. In combination, this should yield between four-to-six moral signatures—distinct combinations or patterns of support for these aspects of morality. We extend previous research by examining the replicability of these moral signatures in a New Zealand-based national sample (n = 3,635). Latent Profile Analysis identified four distinct moral signatures: Individuators, Moderates, Neutrals, and High Moralists. We integrate these moral signatures within the Dual Process Model (DPM) framework and show that Social Dominance Orientation predicts membership in the Neutral moral signature (moderate/lukewarm support for multiple moral foundations); whereas Right-Wing Authoritarianism predicts membership in the High Moralist signature (undifferentiated high support across moral foundations). These findings were observed controlling for Big-Six personality and various demographics. Thus, the authoritarian and dominance-based motives identified by the DPM independently predict categorical differences in the signatures people use to judge morality.

Keywords

Moral Foundations Theory Dual Process Model Latent Profile Analysis 

Notes

Acknowledgments

This research was supported by a Templeton World Charity Foundation Grant (ID: 0077). Mplus syntax for the models reported here is available on the NZAVS website (http://www.psych.auckland.ac.nz/uoa/NZAVS).

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  • Petar Milojev
    • 1
    Email author
  • Danny Osborne
    • 1
  • Lara M. Greaves
    • 1
  • Joseph Bulbulia
    • 2
  • Marc S. Wilson
    • 2
  • Caitlin L. Davies
    • 2
  • James H. Liu
    • 2
  • Chris G. Sibley
    • 1
  1. 1.School of PsychologyUniversity of AucklandAucklandNew Zealand
  2. 2.Victoria University of WellingtonWellingtonNew Zealand

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