Response to commentary on “Is NHST logically flawed”
I thank the Editor for giving me the opportunity to respond to Dr. Patriota’s (2018) brief comment in relation to two of my pervious publications on null hypothesis significance testing (NHST) in this journal (Schneider 2015, 2018). I shall be brief myself in my response.
If I understand Patriota correctly, he insists that I am mistaken when I describe p values as conditional probabilities. According to Patriota, from a frequentist point of view this is incorrect because p values supposedly do not “respect the basic properties of conditional probabilities” (Patriota 2018, p. 2).
I am familiar with Patriota’s claim, one he shares with other frequentists, see for example Larry Wasserman’s blog entry but also the critical comments accompanying it,1 as well as the parallel discussion on Andrew Gelman’s blog;2 Patriota was an avid debater in both discussions. But like Gelman and several other commenters in the debate, I do not think I have misunderstood anything. Whether the pvalue is...
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