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Meta-Theoretical Contributions to the Constitution of a Model-Based Didactics of Science

Abstract

There is nowadays consensus in the community of didactics of science (i.e. science education understood as an academic discipline) regarding the need to include the philosophy of science in didactical research, science teacher education, curriculum design, and the practice of science education in all educational levels. Some authors have identified an ever-increasing use of the concept of ‘theoretical model’, stemming from the so-called semantic view of scientific theories. However, it can be recognised that, in didactics of science, there are over-simplified transpositions of the idea of model (and of other meta-theoretical ideas). In this sense, contemporary philosophy of science is often blurred or distorted in the science education literature. In this paper, we address the discussion around some meta-theoretical concepts that are introduced into didactics of science due to their perceived educational value. We argue for the existence of a ‘semantic family’, and we characterise four different versions of semantic views existing within the family. In particular, we seek to contribute to establishing a model-based didactics of science mainly supported in this semantic family.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    We use the expression ‘science education’ to refer to the practice of educating in science, whereas we call ‘didactics of science’ the academic discipline that reflects and investigates upon such practice (cf., Adúriz-Bravo and Izquierdo-Aymerich 2005). In accordance with this, we call ‘science educators’ the practitioners of science education; ‘didacticians of science’ would then be the academic researchers in our discipline. Equivalent expressions are standard in the main languages in continental Europe (e.g. French: didactique des sciences/didacticiens; German: Didaktik der Naturwissenschaften/Didaktiker; Spanish: didáctica de las ciencias/didactas).

  2. 2.

    In the last 35 years, there is an ever-increasing amount of philosophical work on scientific models. In this article, we centre our attention on the literature that considers models as an essential component of scientific theories, namely the already mentioned semantic view or family. We are of course aware that there exist very rich recent developments on models that analyse them without a reference to theories—as being ‘independent’ of theories, ‘autonomous’, or ‘mediators’ between reality and theories. For such views, which would demand a whole paper of their own, see e.g. Cartwright et al. (1995), Morgan and Morrison (1999), Morrison (1999) and Weisberg (2013).

  3. 3.

    However, it is only fair to make clear that just very few—if any—philosophical schools of science take as a case of study their influence on science teaching.

  4. 4.

    Other versions are: the partial structures approach of N. C. A. Da Costa, S. French, J. Ladyman and O. Bueno (Da Costa and French 1990, 2003; Bueno 1997; French and Ladyman 1999), the approach proposed by R. Torretti (1990), and many ‘European versions’ of the semantic view, such as those of M.L. Dalla Chiara and G. Toraldo di Francia (1973), M. Przełecki (1969) and R. Wójcicki (1976), G. Ludwig (1970, 1978), and E. Scheibe (1997, 1999, 2001).

  5. 5.

    The components of theories (i.e. constituting elements that give them their identity) are boldfaced in the ‘specified’ schemes of Sect. 4.

  6. 6.

    In addition, in some Anglo-Saxon circles the labels ‘German structuralism’ or ‘German structuralist school’ are also used.

  7. 7.

    The reader who would like to have access to an extensive and technically precise presentation of the programme should consult the above-mentioned book by Balzer et al. (1987). For those who want to have a briefer and more informal presentation, we recommend Moulines (2002).

  8. 8.

    The concept of theory-element may be seen as a precision and elaboration of a Kuhnian idea: “A theory consists, among other things, of verbal and symbolic generalizations together with examples of their function in use” (Kuhn 1969, p. 501, emphasis in the original).

  9. 9.

    It is worth noting that meta-theoretical structuralism per se is neutral with respect to the issue of scientific realism (see Sneed 1983; Stegmüller 1986)—understood either in terms of the ‘true description’ (or approximately true description) of the ‘real world’ given by a theory or of the ‘reality’ of the denotata of the T-theoretical terms of a theory—although there are supporters of this approach that have stated the problem within this framework and argued for, as well as against, scientific realism.

  10. 10.

    The concept of a theory-net may be seen, again, as a precision and elaboration of another Kuhnian idea, namely the ‘general principle plus specification relation’ idea: “[…] generalizations [like f = ma] are not so much generalizations as generalisation sketches, schematic forms whose detailed symbolic expression varies from one application to the next. For the problem of free fall, f = ma becomes mg = md2 s/dt 2. For the simple pendulum, it becomes mgsinθ = –md2 s/dt 2. For coupled harmonic oscillators it becomes two equations, the first of which may be written m 1d2 s 1/dt 2 + k 1 s 1 = k 2(d + s 2 − s 1). More interesting mechanical problems, for example the motion of a gyroscope, would display still greater disparity between f = ma and the actual symbolic generalization to which logic and mathematics are applied” (Kuhn 1969, p. 465).

  11. 11.

    Once again, the concept of a theory-evolution may be seen as a precision of some other Kuhnian idea, namely that of normal science.

  12. 12.

    Some authors have recognised the rich development of the structuralist programme. Nancy Cartwright suggests that, in comparison with other semantic approaches, “the German structuralists undoubtedly offer the most satisfactory, detailed and well-illustrated account of the structure of scientific theories on offer” (Cartwright 2008, p. 65). Sebastian Enqvist makes a similar point by claiming that “[t]he structuralist model of theories is impressive in two respects: first, it presents a very detailed analysis of what may be called the deep structure of an empirical theory. Second, it has been shown that a range of actual scientific theories can be reconstructed as theory nets” (Enqvist 2011, p. 107).

  13. 13.

    See, for example, the three “Bibliographies of Structuralism” (Diederich et al. 1989, 1994; Abreu et al. 2013), as well as Balzer et al. (2000).

  14. 14.

    This approach can also be part of the meta-theoretical training of other professionals, for example in the formation of philosophers of science and general philosophers, or in other degrees that include contents of the philosophy of science in their curricula. It would then be necessary to adapt it to match the needs of each audience.

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Acknowledgments

Research reported in this article was supported by Research Grants FFI2012-37354/CONSOLIDER INGENIO CSD2009-0056 (Spain), FFI2013-41415-P (Spain), PICT-2014-1741 and PICT-2013-0503 (ANPCyT, Argentina), and PIP 112-201101-01135 (CONICET, Argentina).

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Correspondence to Yefrin Ariza.

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Ariza, Y., Lorenzano, P. & Adúriz-Bravo, A. Meta-Theoretical Contributions to the Constitution of a Model-Based Didactics of Science. Sci & Educ 25, 747–773 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11191-016-9845-3

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Keywords

  • Science Teacher
  • Scientific Theory
  • Intended Application
  • Semantic Conception
  • Semantic View