Small Business Economics

, Volume 32, Issue 4, pp 397–407 | Cite as

Founding family leadership and industry profitability

Article

Abstract

In this article, we argue that firms in high-margin industries can benefit from founding family influence. Specifically, in more profitable markets, the influence of the founding family provides an additional corporate governance-monitoring function. The sample consists of 294 firm-year observations from 98 publicly traded companies headquartered in Sweden, representing approximately half of all non-financial traded firms. Our support that the effect of family leadership in publicly held firms should be assessed in relation to the intensity of industry competition.

Keywords

Founding family firms Corporate governance Industry profit margins Industry competition Sweden 

JEL Classifications

L26 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC. 2008

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Agder University College, School of ManagementKristiansandNorway
  2. 2.Oregon State UniversityCorvallisUSA
  3. 3.School of BusinessBond UniversityBrisbaneAustralia

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