Founding family leadership and industry profitability
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Abstract
In this article, we argue that firms in high-margin industries can benefit from founding family influence. Specifically, in more profitable markets, the influence of the founding family provides an additional corporate governance-monitoring function. The sample consists of 294 firm-year observations from 98 publicly traded companies headquartered in Sweden, representing approximately half of all non-financial traded firms. Our support that the effect of family leadership in publicly held firms should be assessed in relation to the intensity of industry competition.
Keywords
Founding family firms Corporate governance Industry profit margins Industry competition SwedenJEL Classifications
L26References
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