Advertisement

Res Publica

, Volume 25, Issue 4, pp 487–496 | Cite as

Pluralistic Partisanship

  • Kevin VallierEmail author
Article

Abstract

This essay explores and criticizes Matteo Bonotti’s argument that parties and partisans in a publicly justified polity should appeal primarily, if not exclusively, to accessible justificatory reasons to fulfill their political duties. I argue that political parties should only support coercive policies if they rationally believe that the coercive law or policy in question can be publicly justified to those subject to the law or policy in terms of their own private—specifically intelligible—reasons. I then explore four practical differences between our two approaches. In contrast to Bonotti’s accessible reasons approach, the intelligibility approach (1) facilitates the provision of assurance between citizens and political officials, (2) requires that parties and partisans support fewer coercive policies, (3) allows more exemptions from generally applicable laws, and (4) facilitates logrolling and alliance formation.

Keywords

Political liberalism Public reason Partisanship Democratic theory Partisanship 

Notes

Acknowledgements

I am grateful to Matteo Bonotti for discussion of our two papers.

References

  1. Bonotti, Matteo. 2017. Partisanship and Political Liberalism in Diverse Societies. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  2. Buchanan, James, and Gordon Tullock. 1962. The Calculus of Consent. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  3. Eberle, Christopher. 2002. Religious Conviction in Liberal Politics. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  4. Gaus, Gerald. 1990. Value and Justification: The Foundations of Liberal Theory, Cambridge Studies in Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  5. Gaus, Gerald. 1996. Justificatory Liberalism: An Essay on Epistemology and Political Theory. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  6. Gaus, Gerald. 2011. The Order of Public Reason. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
  7. Kogelmann, Brian, and Stephen G. W. Stich. 2016. When Public Reason Fails Us: Convergence Discourse as Blood Oath. American Political Science Review 110: 717–730.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  8. Laborde, Cécile. 2017. Liberalism’s Religion. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  9. Larmore, Charles. 1999. The Moral Basis of Political Liberalism. The Journal of Philosophy 96: 599–625.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  10. Rawls, John. 1971. A Theory of Justice. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  11. Rawls, John. 2005. Political Liberalism. 2nd edn. New York, NY: Columbia University Press.Google Scholar
  12. Thrasher, John. 2016. The Ethics of Legislative Vote Trading. Political Studies 64: 614–629.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  13. Vallier, Kevin. 2014. Liberal Politics and Public Faith: Beyond Separation. New York, NY: Routledge.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  14. Vallier, Kevin. 2016. The Moral Basis of Religious Exemptions. Law and Philosophy 35: 1–28.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  15. Vallier, Kevin. 2018. Public Justification. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/justification-public/. Accessed 1 July 2019.
  16. White, Jonathan, and Lea Ypi. 2011. On Partisan Political Justification. American Political Science Review 105: 381–396.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  17. Wolterstorff, Nicholas. 1997. The Role of Religion in Decision and Discussion of Political Issues. In Religion in the Public Square: The Place of Religious Convictions in Political Debate, ed. Robert Audi and Nicholas Wolterstorff, 67–120. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Nature B.V. 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Bowling Green State UniversityBowling GreenUSA

Personalised recommendations