Res Publica

, Volume 23, Issue 2, pp 213–226 | Cite as

Privacy and Self-Presentation

Article

Abstract

It has often been argued that one of the reasons why we should value privacy is that it enables self-presentation and impression management. According to this approach, it is valuable to be able to govern the impression one gives, as the capacity to govern impressions is an instrument by which people take care of their various social relationships. In this paper I will take a closer look at that approach on privacy, with specific reference to the alleged threats to privacy created by brain imaging technologies. I will argue that brain imaging can threaten our capacity for self-presentation, but that the link between privacy and self-presentation is only contingent, although their relation is strong. The conclusion is that brain privacy cannot be grounded only on the importance of self-presentation, although self-presentation provides an important reason for respecting the privacy of our inner lives.

Keywords

Impressions Privacy Brain imaging 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of TurkuTurkuFinland

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