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Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting

, Volume 53, Issue 4, pp 967–1003 | Cite as

CEO network centrality and corporate cash holdings

  • Jose Miranda-Lopez
  • Svetlana Orlova
  • Li SunEmail author
Original Research
  • 228 Downloads

Abstract

The social network centrality of Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) has received tremendous attention in recent research. This study examines how CEO network centrality relates to corporate cash holdings. We find a significant negative relation between CEO network centrality and the level of corporate cash holdings, suggesting that firms with higher-centrality CEOs hold less cash. Our results still hold after a battery of robustness checks.

Keywords

CEO network centrality Corporate cash holdings Social network analysis 

JEL Classification

G39 M49 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Collins College of BusinessUniversity of TulsaTulsaUSA

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