Frequencies of board meetings on various topics and corporate governance: evidence from China

  • Jiao JiEmail author
  • Oleksandr Talavera
  • Shuxing Yin
Original Research


This paper examines the relationship between number of topic-specific board meetings and quality of corporate governance. The quality of corporate governance is estimated by CEO turnover-performance and compensation-performance sensitivities. Information about topic-specific meetings is collected from the reports of independent directors of Chinese listed firms. We find that more frequent discussions of growth strategies related to the use of IPO proceeds, investment and acquisitions increase CEO compensation-performance sensitivity. By contrast, more discussions about the nomination of directors and top management are likely to reduce the sensitivities of both CEO turnover and compensation to performance. Our findings shed light on what makes boards efficient, and how board monitoring of assorted decisions modifies the relationship between CEO interests and firm performance.


Board effectiveness Board meeting topics CEO dismissal CEO compensation China 

JEL classification

G30 G34 



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© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of Sheffield Management SchoolSheffieldUK
  2. 2.University of BirminghamBirminghamUK

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