Advertisement

The noetic effects of sin: a dispositional framework

  • Hamid VahidEmail author
Article

Abstract

One of the well-known theses of Alvin Plantinga’s epistemology of religious belief is his claim about the noetic effects of sin. But Plantinga does not clearly spell out how sin functions to undermine or weaken the believer’s natural knowledge of God. In this paper, I want to suggest a dispositional gloss on his account of religious epistemology that properly identifies the epistemic role of sin and other factors that may undermine knowledge of God. It will be further argued that the dispositional framework provides us with a principled basis for deriving some of the main contours of Plantinga’s general epistemology.

Keywords

Plantinga Noetic effects of sin Dispositions Manifestations 

Notes

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank Kelly Clark, Muhammad Legenhausen and an anonymous referee of this journal for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper.

References

  1. Becker, K. (2013). Why reliabilism does not permit easy knowledge. Synthese, 190(17), 3751–3775.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  2. Biederman, I. (1987). Recognition-by-component: A theory of human image understanding. Psychological Review, 94, 115–147.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  3. Bird, A. (1998). Dispositions and antidotes. Philosophical Quarterly, 48, 227–234.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  4. Bolos, A. (2015). Is knowledge of god a cognitive achivement? Ratio, 29(2), 184–201.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  5. Carnap, R. (1936). Testability and meaning. Philosophy of Science, 3, 419–471.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  6. Cuneo, T. (1994). Combating the noetic effects of sin: Pascal’s strategy for natural theology. Faith and Philosophy, 11(4), 645–662.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  7. Evans, C. S. (2010). Natural signs and knowledge of god. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  8. Goldman, A. (1992). Epistemic folkways and scientific epistemology, Liaisons. Cambridge: The MIT Press.Google Scholar
  9. Goldman, A. (1993). Philosophical applications of cognitive science. Boulder: Westview Press.Google Scholar
  10. Johnston, M. (1992). How to speak of the colors. Philosophical Studies, 68, 221–263.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  11. Lewis, D. (1997). Finkish dispositions. The Philosophical Quarterly, 47, 143–158.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  12. Martin, C. B. (1994). Dispositions and conditionals. The Philosophical Quarterly, 44, 1–8.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  13. Pantinga, A. (1993). Warrant: The current debate. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  14. Plantinga, A. (1993). Warrant and proper function. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  15. Plantinga, A. (2000). Warranted christian belief. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  16. Vahid, H. (2018) The dispositional architecture of epistemic reasons. Philosophical Studies.  https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-018-1102-y.

Copyright information

© Springer Nature B.V. 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.School of Analytic PhilosophyInstitute for Research in Fundamental Sciences (IPM)TehranIran

Personalised recommendations