Soul-making theodicy and compatibilism: new problems and a new interpretation

Article
First Online:
Received:
Accepted:
  • 687 Downloads

Abstract

In the elaboration of his soul-making theodicy, John Hick agrees with a controversial point made by compatibilists Antony Flew and John Mackie against the free will defense. Namely, Hick grants that God could have created humans such that they would be free to sin but would, in fact, never do so. In this paper, I identify three previously unrecognized problems that arise from his initial concession to, and ultimate rejection of, compatibilism. The first problem stems from the fact that in two important texts, Hick rejects compatibilism (after having endorsed it as effective against the free will defense) for different and seemingly contradictory reasons. His various explanations of soul-making theodicy’s relationship to compatibilism are therefore in conflict. The second problem is closely related to the first. It turns out that when Hick’s concession to compatibilism is closely examined, soul-making theodicy appears unable to explain the existence of moral evil. The final problem consists in understanding why Hick would have made any concessions to compatibilism in the first place given that he ultimately opts for incompatibilist free will. After identifying these three problems, I develop a distinctive way in which to interpret Hick’s soul-making theodicy that solves the first two. This distinctive interpretation, moreover, has the added benefit of solving another, well-recognized problem that has long plagued Hick’s exposition: the problem of the hypnotist metaphor. Finally, I address the third problem by suggesting a rationale for Hick’s initial concession to the compatibilists.

Keywords

Soul-making theodicy Compatibilism John Hick Hard-won virtues Hypnotist Evil 
This is a preview of subscription content, log in to check access.

Notes

Acknowledgements

Special thanks to Marilyn McCord Adams, Michael V. Dougherty, Brendan Doyle, and members of the University of Buffalo Philosophy Department who attended a presentation of an earlier draft at the University Regent’s Lecture. A generous summer research grant from Niagara University helped make this paper possible.

References

  1. Adams, M. M. (2010). Foreword. In J. Hick (Ed.), Evil and the God of Love (2nd ed.). Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan.Google Scholar
  2. Campbell, C. A. (1957). On Selfhood and Godhood. London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd.Google Scholar
  3. Clarke, R. (2003). Libertarian accounts of free will. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  4. Davis, S. (Ed.). (1981). Encountering evil: Live options in theodicy. Atlanta, GA: Knox Press.Google Scholar
  5. Davis, S. (Ed.). (2001). Encountering evil, a new edition: Live options in theodicy. Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press.Google Scholar
  6. Feinberg, J. S. (2004). The many faces of evil: Theological systems and problems of evil, revised and expanded edition. Wheaton, IL: Crossway Books.Google Scholar
  7. Flew, A. N. (1955). Divine omnipotence and human freedom. In A. Flew & A. MacIntyre (Eds.), New essays in philosophical theology. London: S.C.M. Press Ltd.Google Scholar
  8. Flew, A. N. (1962). Are Ninian Smart’s temptations irresistible? Philosophy, 37, 57–60.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  9. Fulmer, G. (1982). John Hick’s soul-making theodicy. Southwest Philosophical Studies, 7, 170–179.Google Scholar
  10. Geivett, R. (1993). Evil and the evidence for God: The challenge of John Hick’s theodicy. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.Google Scholar
  11. Griffin, D. R. (1976). God, power and evil: A process theodicy. Philadelphia: Westminster Press.Google Scholar
  12. Griffin, D. R. (1981). Critique by David R. Griffin. In S. T. Davis (Ed.), Encountering evil (pp. 53–55). Atlanta: Knox Press.Google Scholar
  13. Hick, J. (1970). Freedom and the Irenaean theodicy again. Journal of Theological Studies, 21(2), 419–422.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  14. Hick, J. (1973). Coherence and the God of love again. The Journal of Theological Studies, 24(2), 522–528.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  15. Hick, J. (1976). Death and eternal life. London: Collins.Google Scholar
  16. Hick, J. (1981). An Irenaean theodicy. In S. T. Davis (Ed.), Encountering evil (pp. 39–68). Atlanta: Knox Press.Google Scholar
  17. Hick, J. (2010). Evil and the God of love (2nd ed.). Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  18. Kane, G. S. (1975a). The failure of soul-making theodicy. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 6(1), 1–22.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  19. Kane, G. S. (1975b). Soul-making theodicy and eschatology. Sophia, 14(2), 24–31.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  20. Mackie, J. L. (1955). Evil and omnipotence. Mind, 64, 200–212.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  21. Mackie, J. L. (1962). Theism and utopia. Philosophy, 37, 153–158.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  22. Martin, M. (1990). Atheism: A philosophical justification. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.Google Scholar
  23. Mesle, R. (1991). John Hick’s theodicy. A process humanist critique. New York: St. Martin’s Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  24. Plantinga, A. (1974). The nature of necessity. Oxford: Clarendon Press.Google Scholar
  25. Plantinga, A. (1977). God, freedom, and evil. Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.Google Scholar
  26. Rist, J. (1972). Coherence and the God of love. Journal of Theological Studies, 23(1), 95–105.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  27. Rowe, W. (1991). Paradox and promise: Hick’s solution to the problem of evil. In H. Hewitt Jr. (Ed.), Problems in the Philosophy of Religion. New York: St. Martin’s Press.Google Scholar
  28. Smart, N. (1961). Omnipotence, evil and supermen. Philosophy, 36, 188–195.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  29. Stump, E. (1985). The problem of evil. Faith and Philosophy, 2, 392–423.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  30. Swinburne, R. (2011). Providence and the problem of evil. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  31. Timpe, K. (2014). Free will in philosophical theology. New York: Bloomsbury.Google Scholar
  32. Trakakis, N. (2007). An epistemically distant God? A critique of John Hick’s response to the problem of divine hiddenness. Heythrop Journal, 48, 214–226.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  33. Ward, K. (1969). Freedom and the Irenaean theodicy. Journal of Theological Studies, 20(1), 249–254.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  34. Widerker, D., & McKenna, M. (Eds.). (2002). Moral responsibility without alternative possibilities. Aldershot: Ashgate Press.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Niagara UniversityNiagara UniversityUSA

Personalised recommendations