Supporting intimates on faith

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Abstract

What is the role of faith in the familiar practice of supporting intimates in their personal projects? Is there anything distinctly valuable about such faith-based support? I argue that the virtue of being supportive, a characteristic of the good friend or lover, involves a distinctive kind of faith: faith in another persons’ chosen self-expressive pursuit(s). Support based on such faith enables the supported party to enjoy a more meaningful and autonomous exercise of agency in self-expressive arenas, and engenders a sense of relational unity or solidarity, deepening the normative and emotional bonds of the relationship.

Keywords

Faith Support Autonomy Solidarity Modally demanding value Intimate relationship 
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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of HawaiiHonoluluUSA

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