Evilism, moral rationalism, and reasons internalism

Article

Abstract

I show that the existence of an omniscient, omnipotent, and essentially omnimalevolent being is impossible given only two metaethical assumptions (viz., moral rationalism and reasons internalism). I then argue (pace Stephen Law) that such an impossibility undercuts Law’s (Relig Stud 46(3):353–373, 2010) evil god challenge.

Keywords

Evidential problem of evil Moral rationalism Reasons internalism Evil god challenge 

Notes

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank Andy Egan, Blake Giunta, Alexander R. Pruss, Joshua Rasmussen, and Dean Zimmerman for their comments on earlier drafts of this paper.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Philosophy DepartmentRutgers UniversityNew BrunswickUSA

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