International Journal for Philosophy of Religion

, Volume 76, Issue 3, pp 297–317 | Cite as

No explanation of persons, no explanation of resurrection: on Lynne Baker’s constitution view and the resurrection of human persons

Article
First Online:
Received:
Accepted:

Abstract

I don’t think Lynne Rudder Baker’s constitution view can account for personal identity problems of a synchronic or diachronic nature. As such, it cannot accommodate the Christian’s claim of eschatological bodily resurrection-a principle reason for which she gives this account. In light of this, I press objections against her constitution view in the following ways: First, I critique an analogy she draws between Aristotle’s “accidental sameness” and constitution. Second, I address three problems for Baker’s constitution view [‘Constitution Problems’ (CP)], each more problematic than the next: CP1: Her definition of constitution lacks explanatory power; CP2: If there is a plausible definition of constitution, constitution implies either too many persons or no human persons at all; CP3: Constitution yields no essential distinction between human and divine persons. If my argument(s) go through, her constitution view has neither an explanation for diachronic personal identity nor personal identity through resurrection.

Keywords

Material constitution Bodily resurrection Personal identity  Lynne Baker 
This is a preview of subscription content, log in to check access.

References

  1. Aristotle. (1966). Metaphysics. (Hippocrates G. Apostle, Trans.). Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.Google Scholar
  2. Baker, L. R. (2004). Christians should reject mind-body dualism. In M. L. Peterson & R. J. Vanarragon (Eds.), Contemporary debates in philosophy of religion (pp. 327–338). Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.Google Scholar
  3. Baker, L. R. (2005). Death and the afterlife. In W. J. William (Ed.), The Oxford handbook of philosophy of religion (pp. 366–391). Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  4. Baker, L. R. (2001a). Material persons and the doctrine of resurrection. Faith and Philosophy, 18(2), 151–167.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  5. Baker, L. R. (2000). Persons and bodies. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  6. Baker, L. R. (2007a). Persons and the metaphysics of resurrection. Religious Studies, 43(3), 333–348.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  7. Baker, L. R., (2001b). Reply to Olson. In Symposium on Persons and Bodies: A Field Guide to Philosophy of Mind. http://www.uniroma3.it/kant/field/bakersymp_replytoolson.htm. Accessed 20 Aug 2013.
  8. Baker, L. R. (2007b). The metaphysics of everyday life. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  9. Baker, L. R. (2007c). The ontology of artifacts. Philosophical Explorations, 7(2), 99–111.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  10. Baker, L. R. (2002). The ontological status of persons. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 65(2), 370–388.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  11. Baker, L. R. (1999). Unity without identity: A new look at material constitution. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 23(1), 144–166.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  12. Baker, L. R. (1997). Why constitution is not identity. The Journal of Philosophy, 94(12), 599–621.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  13. Cohen, S. M. (2008). Kooky objects revisited. Metaphilosophy, 39(1), 3–19.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  14. Corcoran, K. (1999). Persons, bodies, and the constitution relation. Southern Journal of Philosophy, 37, 1–20.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  15. Garrett, B., (2001). The story of I: some comments on L. R. Baker P&B. In Symposium on Persons and Bodies: A Field Guide to Philosophy of Mind. http://www.uniroma3.it/kant/field/bakersymp_garrett.htm. Accessed 20 Aug 2013.
  16. Hasker, W. (2013). Metaphysics and the tri-personal god. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  17. Moreland, J. P. (2009). The recalcitrant imago dei. London: SCM.Google Scholar
  18. Noonan, H., (2011). Identity. In Zalta, E. N., (Ed.), The stanford encyclopedia of philosophy (Winter 2011 Edition). http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2011/entries/identity/. Accessed 15 Sept 2013.
  19. Olson, E. T. (1999). Reply to Lynne Baker. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 59(1), 161–166.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  20. Olson, E. T., (2001). Thinking animals and the constitution view. In Symposium on Persons and Bodies: A Field Guide to Philosophy of Mind. http://www.uniroma3.it/kant/field/bakersymp_olson.htm. Accessed 20 Aug 2013.
  21. Plantinga, A. (1974). The nature of necessity. Oxford: Clarendon Press.Google Scholar
  22. Rea, M. C. (2000). Constitution and kind membership. Philosophical Studies, 97(2), 169–193.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.New CollegeThe University of EdinburghEdinburgh UK

Personalised recommendations