Religious disagreement: internal and external

  • Dennis PotterEmail author


Philosophers of religion have taken the assumption for granted that the various religious traditions of the world have incompatible beliefs. In this paper, I will argue that this assumption is more problematic than has been generally recognized. To make this argument, I will discuss the implications of internal religious disagreement, an aspect of this issue that has been too often ignored in the contemporary debate. I will also briefly examine some implications of my argument for how one might respond to the existence of religious diversity.


Religious diversity Religious disagreement Exclusivism Pluralism Epistemic peer 



I received helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper from Brian Birch, Nathan Kalana-Westbrook, Michael Minch, and (especially) Kevin Schilbrack. I also want to thank audience members at the Society of Christian Philosophers Pacific Division meeting at Westmont College in February 2012 and at the Society for Mormon Philosophy and Theology at Utah State University in September 2012 for their comments.


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Philosophy and HumanitiesUtah Valley UniversityOremUSA

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