Dennett’s deism

Article
  • 312 Downloads

Abstract

To suggest that Daniel Dennett is a deist is to invite ridicule. Dennett is both an avowed atheist and defender of naturalism in philosophy. Yet if we pay heed to the entirety of Dennett’s claims a curious picture emerges. My suggestion is that Hegel and Marx represent the rival responses to what we might call the modern predicament: what is the nature of existence in a world which seems a mechanism? Dennett’s response to this question is Hegelian, and involves a commitment to a religiosity which might surprise those otherwise receptive to his arguments.

Keywords

Dennett Deism Naturalism Hegel Marx Darwin 

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  1. Akins K. (1993) What is it like to be boring and myopic. In: Dahlbom D. (eds) Dennett and his critics—demystifying mind. Blackwell, OxfordGoogle Scholar
  2. Akins K. (2002) A question of content. In: Brook A., Ross D. (eds) Daniel Dennett. Cambridge University Press, CambridgeGoogle Scholar
  3. Berry C. J. (1982) Hume, Hegel and human nature. Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague/LondonGoogle Scholar
  4. Brook A. (2000) Judgments and drafts eight years later. In: Ross D. et al. (eds) Dennett’s philosophy— a comprehensive assessment. The MIT Press, LondonGoogle Scholar
  5. Brook A., Ross D. (2002) Dennett’s position in the intellectual world. In: Brook A., Ross D. (eds) Daniel Dennett. Cambridge University Press, CambridgeGoogle Scholar
  6. Churchland P. M. (2002) Catching consciousness in a recurrent net. In: Brook A., Ross D. (eds) Daniel Dennett. Cambridge University Press, CambridgeGoogle Scholar
  7. Churchland P., Ramachandran V. S. (1993) Filling in: Why Dennett is wrong. In: Dahlbom D. (eds) Dennett and his critics—demystifying mind. Blackwell, OxfordGoogle Scholar
  8. Dahlbom B. (1993) Mind is artificial. In: Dahlbom D. (eds) Dennett and his critics—demystifying mind. Blackwell, OxfordGoogle Scholar
  9. Dennett D. C. (1984) Elbow room. OUP, OxfordGoogle Scholar
  10. Dennett D. C. (1987) The intentional stance. Bradford, MassachusettsGoogle Scholar
  11. Dennett D. C. (1993a) Back from the drawing board. In: Dahlbom D. (eds) Dennett and his critics—demystifying mind. Blackwell, OxfordGoogle Scholar
  12. Dennett D. C. (1993b) Consciousness explained. Penguin, LondonGoogle Scholar
  13. Dennett D. C. (1995) Darwin’s dangerous idea. Penguin, LondonGoogle Scholar
  14. Dennett D. C. (2000) With a little help from my friends. In: Ross D. et al. (eds), Dennett’s philosophy— a comprehensive assessment. The MIT Press, LondonGoogle Scholar
  15. Dennett D. C. (2003) Freedom evolves. Penguin, LondonGoogle Scholar
  16. Dennett D.C. (2006) Breaking the spell. Penguin, LondonGoogle Scholar
  17. Hobbes, T. (1654/1999). Of liberty and necessity. In V. Chappell (Ed.), Hobbes and Bramhall on liberty and necessity. Cambridge: CUP.Google Scholar
  18. Knox, T. M. (eds) (1967) Hegel’s philosophy of right, with an introduction. OUP, LondonGoogle Scholar
  19. Kuhn T. S. (1996) The structure of scientific revolutions (3rd ed.). University of Chicago Press, ChicagoGoogle Scholar
  20. McGinn C. (1993) Logic, mind and mathematics. In: Dahlbom D. (eds) Dennett and his critics—demystifying mind. Blackwell, OxfordGoogle Scholar
  21. Oakeshott, M. (1933/1985). Experience and its modes. Cambridge: Press Syndicate (University of Cambridge)Google Scholar
  22. Rorty R. (1993) Holism, intrinsicality, and the ambition of transcendence. In: Dahlbom D. (eds) Dennett and his critics—demystifying mind. Blackwell, OxfordGoogle Scholar
  23. Ross D. (2000) Introduction: The Dennettian stance. In: Ross D. et al. (eds), Dennett’s philosophy— a comprehensive assessment. The MIT Press, LondonGoogle Scholar
  24. Ross D. (2002) Dennett and the Darwin wars. In: Brook A., Ross D. (eds) Daniel Dennett. Cambridge University Press, CambridgeGoogle Scholar
  25. Seager W. (2000) Real patterns and surface metaphysics. In: Ross D. et al. (eds), Dennett’s philosophy— a comprehensive assessment. The MIT Press, LondonGoogle Scholar
  26. Searle J. (2003) Rationality in action. MIT Press, Cambridge MassGoogle Scholar
  27. Smart J. J. C. (2003) Free will, praise and blame. In: Watson G. (eds) Free will. Oxford University Press, OxfordGoogle Scholar
  28. Tucker R. C. (1972) The Marx-Engels reader. Norton, New YorkGoogle Scholar
  29. Wilks Y. (2002) Dennett and artificial intelligence: On the same side, and if so, of what?. In: Brook A., Ross D. (eds) Daniel Dennett. Cambridge University Press, CambridgeGoogle Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Langside CollegeGlasgowUK

Personalised recommendations