There has been a recent explosion of interest in the epistemology of disagreement. Much of the recent literature is concerned with a particular range of puzzle cases (discussed in the “Cases” section of my paper). Almost all of the papers that contribute to that recent literature make mention of questions about religious disagreement in ways that suggest that there are interesting connections between those puzzle cases and real life cases of religious disagreement. One important aim of my paper is to cast doubt on that suggestion. More generally, the aim of my paper is to give a reasonably full account of the recent literature on the epistemology of disagreement, and then to give a serious discussion of some of the epistemological issues that are raised by real world religious disagreements.
KeywordsDisagreement Doxastic peer Epistemology of disagreement Reasonable disagreement Religious disagreement Shared evidence
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
- Elga A. (2010) How to disagree about how to disagree. In: Feldman R., Warfield T. (eds) Disagreement. Oxford University Press, OxfordGoogle Scholar
- Feldman R. (2006) Epistemological puzzles about disagreement. In: Hetherington S. (eds) Epistemology Futures. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 216–237Google Scholar
- Feldman, R. (2007) In L. Anthony (Ed.) Philosophers without Gods: Meditations on atheism and the secular life (pp. 194–214). Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
- Frances, B. (forthcoming). The reflective epistemic renegade. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.Google Scholar
- Gardner, S., Oppy, G. (in progress). When Bayesians disagree.Google Scholar
- Goldman, A. (2006). Social epistemology. Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epistemology-social/.
- Goldman A. (2010) Epistemic relativism and reasonable disagreement. In: Feldman R., Warfield T. (eds) Disagreement. Oxford University Press, OxfordGoogle Scholar
- Gutting G. (1982) Religious belief and religious scepticism. University of Notre Dame Press, Notre DameGoogle Scholar
- Harman G. (1986) Change in view. MIT Press, Cambridge, MAGoogle Scholar
- Kelly T. (2005) The epistemic significance of disagreement. In: Gendler T., Hawthorne J. (eds) Oxford studies in epistemology (Vol. 1). OUP, Oxford, pp 167–196Google Scholar
- Kelly T. (2010) Peer disagreement and higher order evidence. In: Feldman R., Warfield T. (eds) Disagreement. Oxford University Press, OxfordGoogle Scholar
- Lackey J. (2009a) What should we do when we disagree?. In: Gendler T., Hawthorne J. (eds) Oxford studies in epistemology (Vol. 3). OUP, OxfordGoogle Scholar
- Lackey J. (2009b) A justificationist view of disagreement’s epistemic significance. In: Haddock A., Millar A., Pritchard D. (eds) Social epistemology. OUP, OxfordGoogle Scholar
- List C., Pettit P. (2002) Aggregating sets of judgments: An impossibility result. Economics and Philosophy 18(1): 89–110Google Scholar
- Moffatt M. (2007) Reasonable disagreement and rational group inquiry. Episteme 4: 352–367Google Scholar
- Plantinga A. (1995) Pluralism: A defence of religious exclusivism. In: Senor T. (eds) The rationality of belief and the plurality of faith. Cornell University Press, IthacaGoogle Scholar
- Rosen G. (2001) Nominalism, naturalism, epistemic relativism. Philosophical Perspectives 15: 69–91Google Scholar
- Shogenji, T. (2007). A conundrum in Bayesian epistemology of disagreement, ms. www.ric.edu/tshogenji/.
- Sosa, E. (unpublished) The epistemology of disagreement. http://philpapers.org/rec/SOSTEO-2.
- van Inwagen P. (1995) Quam Dilecta. In: Morris T. (eds) God and the philosophers: The reconciliation of faith and reason. Oxford University Press, OxfordGoogle Scholar
- van Inwagen P. (1999) It is wrong, everywhere, always, and for anyone to believe anything upon insufficient evidence. In: Stump E., Murray M. (eds) Philosophy of religion: The big questions. Wiley-Blackwell, London, pp 273–285Google Scholar