There has been a recent explosion of interest in the epistemology of disagreement. Much of the recent literature is concerned with a particular range of puzzle cases (discussed in the “Cases” section of my paper). Almost all of the papers that contribute to that recent literature make mention of questions about religious disagreement in ways that suggest that there are interesting connections between those puzzle cases and real life cases of religious disagreement. One important aim of my paper is to cast doubt on that suggestion. More generally, the aim of my paper is to give a reasonably full account of the recent literature on the epistemology of disagreement, and then to give a serious discussion of some of the epistemological issues that are raised by real world religious disagreements.


Disagreement Doxastic peer Epistemology of disagreement Reasonable disagreement Religious disagreement Shared evidence 


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© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.School of Philosophy and BioethicsMonash UniversityClaytonAustralia

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