Surviving resurrection

Article

Abstract

In this paper we examine and critique the constitution view of the metaphysics of resurrection developed and defended by Lynne Rudder Baker. Baker identifies three conditions for an adequate metaphysics of resurrection. We argue that one of these, the identity condition, cannot be met on the constitution view given the account of personal identity it assumes. We discuss some problems with the constitution theory of personal identity Baker develops in her book, Persons and Bodies. We argue that these problems render the constitution theory of personal identity as stated by Baker untenable. The upshot for the debate over the metaphysics of resurrection is that the constitution view of the metaphysics of resurrection must either be rejected or modified.

Keywords

Resurrection Personal identity Persons Constitution Lynne Rudder Baker Metaphysics 

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  1. Baker L. (1995). Need a Christian be a mind/body dualist?. Faith and Philosophy 12: 489–504 Google Scholar
  2. Baker L. (2000). Persons and bodies: A constitution view. Cambridge University Press, New York Google Scholar
  3. Baker L. (2001a). Materialism with a human face. In: Corcoran, K. (eds) Soul, body and survival: Essays on the metaphysics of human persons, pp 159–180. Cornell University Press, Ithaca Google Scholar
  4. Baker L. (2001b). Material persons and the doctrine of resurrection. Faith and Philosophy 18: 151–167 Google Scholar
  5. Baker L. (2002). The ontological status of persons. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65: 370–396 CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  6. Baker L. (2004a). Christians should reject mind-body dualism. In: Peterson, M. and VanArragon, R. (eds) Contemporary debates in the philosophy of religion, pp 327–338. Blackwell, Malden, MA Google Scholar
  7. Baker L. (2004b). Reply to Zimmerman. In: Peterson, M. and VanArragon, R. (eds) Contemporary debates in the philosophy of religion, pp 341–343. Blackwell, Malden, MA Google Scholar
  8. Baker L. (2007). Persons and the metaphysics of resurrection. Religious Studies 43: 333–348 CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  9. Baker, L. (2008). Big-tent metaphysics. Abstracta (Special Issue 1), 8–15Google Scholar
  10. Baron-Cohen S. and Wheelwright S. (2004). The empathy quotient: An investigation of adults with Asperger Syndrome or High Functioning Autism and normal sex differences. Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders 34: 163–175 CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  11. Corcoran K. (2001). Physical persons and postmortem survival without temporal gaps. In: Corcoran, K. (eds) Soul, body and survival: Essays on the metaphysics of human persons, pp 201–217. Cornell University Press, Ithaca Google Scholar
  12. Damasio A. and Maurer M. (1978). A neurological model for childhood autism. Archives in Neurology 35: 777–786 Google Scholar
  13. Frankfurt, H. (1988). The importance of what we care about. In The importance of what we care about (pp. 80–94). New York: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
  14. Frankfurt, H. (1999). On caring. In Necessity, volition, and love (pp. 155–80). New York: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
  15. Grossberg S. and Seidman D. (2006). Neural dynamics of autistic behaviors: Cognitive, emotional and timing substrates. Psychological Review 113: 483–525 CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  16. Kennett J. (2002). Autism, empathy and moral agency. The Philosophical Quarterly 52: 340–357 CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  17. McGeer V. (2004). Autistic self-awareness. Philosophy, Psychiatry and Psychology 11: 235–251 CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  18. Minshew N., Goldstein G. and Siegel D. (1995). Speech and language in high-functioning autistic individuals. Neuropsychology 9: 255–261 CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  19. Murphy N. (2006). Bodies and souls, or spirited bodies?. Cambridge University Press, New York Google Scholar
  20. Olson E. (1997). The human animal. Oxford University Press, New York Google Scholar
  21. Parfit D. (1971). Personal identity. The Philosophical Review 80: 3–27 CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  22. Russo N., Flanagan T., Iarocci G., Berringer D., Zelazo P. and Burack J. (2007). Deconstructing executive deficits among persons with autism: Implications for cognitive neuroscience. Brain and Cognition 65: 77–86 CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  23. Sigelman C. K. and Rider E. A. (2006). Life-span human development. Thomas Wadsworth, Belmont, CA Google Scholar
  24. Van Inwagen P. (1978). The possibility of resurrection. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 9: 114–121 CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  25. Velleman J. D. (1996). Self to self. The Philosophical Review 105: 39–76 CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Philosophy and Religious StudiesMarist CollegePoughkeepsieUSA
  2. 2.John. C. Whitehead School of Diplomacy and International Relations, Seton Hall UniversitySouth OrangeUSA

Personalised recommendations