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Review of Industrial Organization

, Volume 55, Issue 3, pp 515–533 | Cite as

Williamson’s Welfare Trade-Off Around the World

  • Germán BetEmail author
  • Roger D. Blair
Article

Abstract

Fifty years ago, Williamson (Am Econ Rev 58:23, 1968) argued that an efficiency-enhancing merger that reduces production costs but increases market power could be saved from antitrust condemnation if the cost savings created by the merger offset the allocative inefficiency. In this paper, we discuss some extensions of Williamson’s basic welfare tradeoff, and explore the attitudes of several countries around the world toward merger efficiencies. In spite of its economic logic, Williamson’s analysis has not been embraced by most of the antitrust authorities around the world. We explore different reasons why antitrust authorities have failed to adopt an explicit social-welfare standard.

Keywords

Merger Antitrust Welfare standard Efficiencies 

JEL Classification

L4 L44 

Notes

Acknowledgements

We thank Jessica Haynes, the late David Kaserman, and D. Daniel Sokol for past collaboration. We also thank Tirza Angerhofer for her research assistance, Stephen Martin, David Sappington, and Larry White for helpful comments and suggestions, and D. Daniel Sokol for some much needed advice.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of EconomicsUniversity of FloridaGainesvilleUSA
  2. 2.Department of Economics and Affiliate Faculty, Levin College of LawUniversity of FloridaGainesvilleUSA

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