Review of Industrial Organization

, Volume 53, Issue 4, pp 615–635 | Cite as

Recent Developments at the CMA: 2017–2018

  • Adriano BassoEmail author
  • Julie Bon
  • Bethany Tasker
  • Natalie Timan
  • Mike Walker
  • Chris Whitcombe


We describe three interesting cases that the UK Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) has dealt with over the past year: first, we discuss the merger of two online food ordering platforms—Just Eat and Hungryhouse—which required an assessment of competition in the presence of indirect network effects. Second, we discuss the vertical merger of a grocery retailer and wholesaler—Tesco and Booker—which posed the challenge of how to assess a firm’s incentives to foreclose its rivals when there are thousands of local markets. Finally, we discuss Open Banking, which lies at the heart of the package of remedies that came out of the CMA’s market investigation into personal banking, and sought to tackle issues of low customer engagement.


CMA Competition policy Mergers Platforms Remedies 



The views that are expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the CMA. We thank Siobhan Dennehy, Chris Doyle, Bill Roberts, Robert Ryan, and Tom Smith for helpful comments.


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Competition and Markets AuthorityLondonUK

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