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Review of Industrial Organization

, Volume 53, Issue 4, pp 637–651 | Cite as

Economics at the Antitrust Division: 2017–2018

  • Luke M. Froeb
  • Russell W. Pittman
  • Charles S. Taragin
  • Steven Tschantz
  • Gregory J. WerdenEmail author
Article
  • 154 Downloads

Abstract

This article describes some of the work of Antitrust Division economists over the past year, with a focus on modeling. It begins by illustrating the mapping from evidence to prediction using tools for assessing the effects of mergers using Bertrand, Cournot, and auction models. It then turns to two hot topics in competition policy: the implications of claims of increasing margins for merger enforcement and the validity of claims of increasing concentration. Finally, it considers how mergers affect prices in bargaining models.

Keywords

Antitrust Bargaining Concentration Mergers 

JEL Classification

C78 K21 L40 

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Copyright information

© This is a U.S. Government work and not under copyright protection in the US; foreign copyright protection may apply 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Luke M. Froeb
    • 1
  • Russell W. Pittman
    • 3
  • Charles S. Taragin
    • 3
  • Steven Tschantz
    • 2
  • Gregory J. Werden
    • 3
    • 4
    Email author
  1. 1.William C. Oehmig Chair of Free Enterprise and Entrepreneurship at Owen Graduate School of ManagementVanderbilt UniversityNashvilleUSA
  2. 2.Department of MathematicsVanderbilt UniversityNashvilleUSA
  3. 3.Antitrust DivisionU.S. Department of JusticeWashingtonUSA
  4. 4.ArlingtonUSA

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