Legal Treatment of Abuse of Dominance in Indian Competition Law: Adopting an Effects-Based Approach

  • Payal Malik
  • Neha MalhotraEmail author
  • Ramji Tamarappoo
  • Nisha Kaur Uberoi


Abuse of dominance investigations around the world are often form-based, primarily centred on the pre-requisite of dominance. This may lead to false positives or restrict innovation in today’s dynamic and complex markets. Accordingly, abuse of dominance enforcement requires a shift towards adopting an effects-based approach, weighing pro and anticompetitive effects and considering efficiency justifications. The European Union is increasingly moving in this direction, as is demonstrated by its case law that is analysed in this paper. The paper also explores competition law in India—traditionally a form-based jurisdiction for abuse of dominance investigations—and finds an encouraging trend towards an effects-based approach.


Abuse of dominance Competition Effects-based Form-based India 


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© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Competition Commission of IndiaNew DelhiIndia
  2. 2.PGDAV CollegeUniversity of DelhiNew DelhiIndia
  3. 3.Nathan Economic Consulting India Private LimitedChennaiIndia
  4. 4.Nathan Associates Inc.ArlingtonUSA
  5. 5.Competition Law Practice, TrilegalNew DelhiIndia

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