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Review of Industrial Organization

, Volume 47, Issue 3, pp 247–258 | Cite as

Behavioral Consumers in Industrial Organization: An Overview

  • Michael D. Grubb
Article

Abstract

This paper overviews three primary branches of the industrial organization literature with behavioral consumers. The literature is organized according to whether consumers: (1) have non-standard preferences; (2) are overconfident or otherwise biased such that they systematically misweight different dimensions of price and other product attributes; or (3) fail to choose the best price due to suboptimal search, confusion comparing prices, or excessive inertia. The importance of consumer heterogeneity and equilibrium effects are also highlighted along with recent empirical work.

Keywords

Behavioral industrial organization Bounded rationality Loss aversion Present bias Overconfidence Exploitative contracting Search Obfuscation Switching Inertia 

JEL Classification

D41 D42 D43 D81 D82 D83 L11 L12 L13 L15 

Notes

Acknowledgments

I am grateful to Vera Sharunova for her excellent research assistance.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Economics DepartmentBoston CollegeChestnut HillUSA

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