Proper Treatment of Buyer Power in Merger Review
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In this paper, we assess the appropriate treatment of buyer power in merger review. We conclude that, for changes in bargaining outcomes due to a buyer merger to create efficiencies, it must be the case that, post-merger, the parties are able to arrive at a more optimal price schedule, perhaps due to reduced transactions costs. Empirical tests will be important to the evaluation of such efficiencies. We further conclude that, under certain conditions, powerful buyers may be able to prevent higher prices from a merger of suppliers. Once again, empirical tests should guide the evaluation of this merger defense.
KeywordsBuyer power Merger review Monopsony
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