Review of Industrial Organization

, Volume 37, Issue 2, pp 83–99 | Cite as

Assessing the Efficacy of Structural Merger Remedies: Choosing Between Theories of Harm?

Article

Abstract

This paper shows that many structural remedies in a sample of European merger cases result in market structures which would probably not be cleared by the Competition Authority (CA) if they were the result of merger (rather than remedy). This is explained by the fact that the CA’s objective through remedy is to restore pre-merger competition, but markets are often highly concentrated even before merger. If so, the CA must often choose between clearing an ‘uncompetitive’ merger, or applying an unsatisfactory remedy. Here, the CA appears reluctant to intervene against coordinated effects, if doing so enhances a leader’s dominance.

Keywords

Collective dominance Coordinated effects Merger remedies Single dominance Tacit collusion 

JEL Classification

L13 L41 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC. 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Centre for Competition PolicyUniversity of East AngliaNorwichUK
  2. 2.Economics and Strategy Group, Aston Business SchoolAston UniversityBirminghamUK

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