Review of Industrial Organization

, Volume 25, Issue 3, pp 231–250 | Cite as

Vertical Structure and Patent Pools

  • Sung-Hwan KimEmail author


It is well known that patent pools can enhance efficiency by eliminating the complements problem. This paper investigates how the presence of vertically integrated firms affects the economic impact of a patent pool. Without a patent pool, the presence of integrated firms may either increase or decrease the final product price as there are two countervailing effects – reduced double marginalization and raising rivals’ costs. However, when there is a patent pool, vertical integration always lowers the final product price. In conclusion, the economic efficiency arguments for patent pools are enhanced when some firms are vertically integrated.


Double marginalization licensing patent pool raising rivals’ costs vertical integration 


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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 2004

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of EconomicsJohns Hopkins UniversityBaltimoreU.S.A

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