Review of Economics of the Household

, Volume 15, Issue 3, pp 833–856 | Cite as

Child-custody reform and the division of labor in the household

Article

Abstract

We investigate whether the adoption of joint-custody laws affects the amount of time that married mothers and fathers devote to market and household work. Our findings suggest that custody reform induces a reallocation of time within marriage, with mothers working more in the market and fathers working more in the home. However, fathers lower their labor-force-participation rates in response to custody reform. The patterns in the data are most easily reconciled with models that emphasize shifts in bargaining power to one household member, which is likely the father in the case of joint-custody reform.

Keywords

Household labor supply Market work Household work Child custody Household bargaining 

JEL Classification

D13 J22 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Auburn UniversityAuburnUSA
  2. 2.University of Wisconsin-La CrosseLa CrosseUSA

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